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International Nuclear and Radiological - Latest Events


Recently posted reports on News.iaea.org
Recently posted reports on News.iaea.org

March 19th, 2025 16:42:19 EDT -0400 Radiactive Waste Facility Taken Over
On Sunday March the 2nd, 2025, at approximately 6:30 AM (UTC-06:00), personnel from the municipality of Temascalapa forcibly took over the Low and Medium Level Radioactive Waste Storage Center (CADER), property of the National Institute of Nuclear Research (ININ), evicting the personnel who were at the facility and subsequently placing seals of closure at the entrances. The video surveillance and environmental radiation monitoring systems that CADER has were disabled and there was no way to know the status inside the Center. Negotiations took place out between personnel from the government of the State of Mexico and the Municipality of Temascalapa, without reaching agreements so far. In addition to the radioactive material and depleted uranium that are kept in the facility, work tools from a foreign company were also retained inside it. Federal Authorities were working to regain control of the facility. The source term of the facility is estimated at approximately 1,041.55 TBq of Co-60 and its surface area is 16.2 HA On Thusrday March the 13th, 2025, people from the Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias (CNSNS) conducted two reconnaissance procedures at the CADER, one on safety and the other one on security. No abnormal conditions were detected during the safety inspection. Regarding the security inspection, the following were observed: • It was confirmed that no intrusion occurred in any of the three CADER radioactive waste warehouses. • Intentional damage was found to equipment related to CCTV, alarm systems, voice and data transmission, and other systems. According to the personnel from the ININ who attended the reconnaissance procedure, the extent of the damage was such that it was not possible to restore these systems during the procedure. Additionally, two CCTV cameras were removed and a third was disabled (covered with a plastic bag), all of which located in the security booth. • It was confirmed that personnel not associated with the facility broke into the CADER administrative offices. According to ININ staff, a solid-state storage drive containing sensitive CADER information was initially detected missing. The sabotage of the CADER's physical protection system left the facility in imminent risk (according to article 181 of Mexico's General Regulations on Radiological Safety), which is why the preventive and security measure consisting of securing the radioactive material stored in the CADER was executed, placing security seals at the entrances to the three warehouses for this purpose. Finally, on Friday March the 14th, 2025, after negotiations among the Federal, State and Municipal authorities, control of the CADER was returned to ININ (who is the owner and administrator of the facility), so the CADER is back under his owner control.
March 19th, 2025 16:10:00 EDT -0400 Lost Radiography Device
On March 6, 2025, a radiography crew working approximately 16 km (10 mi) east of Mentone, Texas, reported losing a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 3.53 TBq (95.4 Ci) iridium-192 source. Update: On March 13, 2025, a member of the public contacted the licensee stating they had found the exposure device. The device was recovered by and is in the possession of the licensee. The device had remained in a locked shed since being found. The exposure device was found to be intact and no attempt was made to operate or tamper with the device. Exposure levels were normal and no individual would have received any significant exposure due to this event. NRC EN57596
March 13th, 2025 09:44:25 EDT -0400 Lost Radiography Device
On March 6, 2025, a radiography crew working approximately 16 km (10 mi) east of Mentone, Texas, reported losing a SPEC 150 exposure device containing a 3.53 TBq (95.4 Ci) iridium-192 source. A trainee set the exposure device on the back of the truck but failed to secure the device in the truck. The source was in the fully shielded position. Shortly after leaving the work site, the radiographers realized the exposure device was no longer in the back of the truck. The radiographers retraced the path they had traveled but did not find the device. Two other trucks passing that way were stopped but the drivers had not seen the device. The licensee has offered a cash award for the return of the device and Texas state authorities issued a press release to alert the public (https://www.dshs.texas.gov/news-alerts/dshs-notifies-public-missing-radiographic-camera-loving-county). U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program teams have assisted the licensee and Texas state authorities in searching for the device. State authorities have also contacted Federal and local law enforcement for assistance. NRC EN57596
March 7th, 2025 08:52:17 EST -0500 Stolen Radiography Camera
On 27 February 2025, a radiography camera containing 2.738 TBq (74 Ci) of Ir-192 was reported stolen from a licensee’s truck. On 26 February 2025, the radiographer stayed the night at a hotel in Kernersville, NC and discovered the next morning that the camera was missing. The radiographer had not followed approved procedures for securing the camera. They immediately notified North Carolina state authorities and local law enforcement. A search of the area was performed but the device could not be located. Hotel surveillance camera footage was reviewed but did not provide any useful information. North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services issued a press release (https://www.ncdhhs.gov/news/press-releases/2025/02/28/ncdhhs-issues-alert-missing-radioactive-material-triad-area) to warn the public of the potential danger of the device and to contact authorities if it is found or anyone has knowledge of its location. North Carolina state regulators and law enforcement investigations are ongoing. Based on activity, the source involved was Category 2. NRC EN57574
March 3rd, 2025 17:54:43 EST -0500 Radiactive Waste Facility Taken Over
On March the 2nd,2025 at approximately 6:30 AM (UTC-6), personnel from the municipality of Temascalapa forcibly took over the Low and Medium Level Radioactive Waste Storage Center (CADER), evicting the personnel from the National Institute of Nuclear Research (ININ), who were working at the facility and subsequently placing seals of closure at the entrances. The video surveillance and environmental radiation monitoring systems that CADER has were disabled and there is no way to know the current status inside the Center. Negotiations are being carried out between personnel from the government of the State of Mexico and the Municipality of Temascalapa, without reaching agreements so far. In addition to the radioactive material and depleted uranium that are being kept in the facility, work tools from a foreign company were also retained inside it. Currently, Federal Authorities are working to regain control of the facility. The source term of the facility is estimated at approximately 1,041.55 TBq of Co-60 and its surface area is 16.2 HA
December 26th, 2024 05:58:24 EST -0500 Accidential Exposure of Industrial Radiography Worker
On September 12, 2023, during industrial radiography, the control cable of the equipment ruptured, causing the radiation source(Ir-192, 1.75 TBq) to detach inside the guide tube. The worker was unable to notice the detachment of the radiation source in time due to the lack of proper radiation safety equipment and continued working. After completing the work, it was confirmed that all the taken film were overexposed, leading to the realization that the radiation source had detached. Although no clinically significant effects, such as blood abnormalities or skin tissue reactions, were observed, the radiation dose assessment indicated an effective dose of 116 mSv and a hand (skin) equivalent dose of 1967 mSv.
December 26th, 2024 05:57:53 EST -0500 Exposure of Workers at a Facility using a Radiation Generating Device
In July 2017, at a semiconductor manufacturing company, seven workers were exposed to radiation due to the abnormal use of an X-ray generator(100 kVp, 0.1 mA) for product defect inspection. The X-ray generator was a cabinet-type device with a shielding door interlock, but the workers manually disabled the interlock, allowing the shielding door to be opened while the X-rays continued to emit. While the X-rays were being emitted, the workers inserted their hands and upper bodies into the device to perform the work. Among the seven exposed workers, two workers developed radiation effects on their hands, including erythema, pain, and blisters. Radiation dose assessments conducted that while the effective dose for the seven workers did not exceed the annual dose limit, the skin equivalent dose exceeded the annual dose limit for all of them.
December 26th, 2024 05:57:27 EST -0500 Accidential Exposure of Industrial Radiography Worker
On August 24, 2018, during industrial radiography using a sealed radiation source (Ir-192, 1.22 TBq), the radiation source became stuck inside the guide tube, making it impossible to retrieve. During the initial response, the remote control cable was incorrectly assembled in the opposite direction, but the worker did not notice this mistake. The worker believed that the source had been safely retrieved into a shielding container, but instead, the source was pushed outside the container and remained inside the guide tube. When the worker attempted to detach the guide tube from the shielding container, the source became exposed. The worker then physically handled the source capsule with bare hands, resulting in radiation exposure. At the time, the worker did not have a radiation detector, so the exact position of the source was unknown. The source was later safely retrieved by another worker. The worker’s hand equivalent dose was assessed as 960 mSv, which exceeds the dose limit.
December 26th, 2024 05:55:58 EST -0500 Exposure from a Medical Treatment Source
On July 21, 2017, at a hospital in Seoul, an incident occurred when the assigned staff member failed to follow the patient verification procedure in the I-131 therapy room. As a result, a dose of I-131 (5,550 MBq), intended for a thyroid desease patient, was mistakenly administered to another patient. The misadministrated patient had been hospitalized since July 19 for MIBG therapy and had already received a dose of I-131 (7,400 MBq). Due to the misadministration, the additional thyroid absorbed dose was estimated to be between 15.6 and 24.4 Gy.
December 26th, 2024 05:55:30 EST -0500 Workers Exceeded Annual Whole Body Dose Limits
In December 2016, it was reported to the regulatory authority that an industrial radiography worker's personal dosimeter reading had exceeded the annual dose limit. An investigation revealed that the worker had been exposed to high levels of radiation on a night-field radiography work during November and December 2016. As a result, the worker developed a deterministic effect(pancytopenia). Additionally, three other workers at the same company were found to have exceeded the dose limit. Among the four workers, the highest effective dose was evaluated at a maximum of 1.19 Sv.
December 26th, 2024 05:54:59 EST -0500 Accidential Exposure of Industrial Radiography Worker
On December 3, 2015, an industrial radiography worker repeatedly conducted NDT without realizing that a sealed radioactive source(Ir-192, 1.1 TBq) had not been properly retracted and remained at the end of the guide tube. On December 8, the worker began feeling symptoms such as pain, redness, and blisters on both hands. Although the worker received treatment at a common hospital, no further actions were taken at that time. On January 27, 2016, the incident was reported to the regulatory authority, and the worker received treatment at a specialized hospital on radiation hazard. The equivalent dose to the worker's hands was estimated to be approximately 30 Sv.
December 26th, 2024 05:53:22 EST -0500 Accidential Exposure of Industrial Radiography Worker
On April 20, 2015, two workers were conducting a industrial radiography for Non-Destructive Test on the welds of a large steel product. During the process, the guide tube of the irradiator was not properly connected, causing the radiation source (Co-60, 1.85 TBq) to be withdrawn but not retrieved. One of the workers entered the radiographic testing room to retrieve the radiation source but accidentally stepped on the source without realizing its location, resulting in radiation exposure. On May 6, 2015, erythema was observed on the sole of his right foot, leading to the recognition of excessive radiation exposure. The doses were assessed as an effective dose of 0.9 mSv and a foot equivalent dose of 2.5 Sv.
December 26th, 2024 05:52:41 EST -0500 Accidential Exposure of Industrial Radiography Worker
On June 26, 2014, during the setup and operation of testing equipment for industrial radiography, a radiation exposure incident occurred. The support structure of the equipment fell onto the guide tube, causing it to deform and disabling the retrieval of the radiation source(Co-60, 2.1 TBq). While attempting to repair the damaged portion of the guide tube by hand, the worker was exposed to radiation. The personal dosimeter reading indicated an effective dose of 117.1 mSv. Radiation burns were observed on the worker's hand, and the hand equivalent dose was estimated to be between 10 and 25.8 Sv.
December 18th, 2024 06:04:37 EST -0500 Package containing four radioactive sources lost.
On Thursday 12th December 2024, LOMA SYSTEMS S.R.O. sent from the Czech Republic a B(U) package, model NE4C, with 4 encapsulated radioactive sources of Se-75 (3.4 TBq each one), used for industrial radiography, to a radioactive facility located in Madrid. These sources are classified as category 2 according to IAEA RS-G-1.9. The package was sent from Prague airport, with ticket number AWB 797-1000 2016 of the airline TRAVEL SERVICE, A.S., on flight QS1056, which arrived at 13:05 at Madrid - Barajas Airport. On Friday 13th, staff of the consignee went to the cargo handling facility to pick up the package and transport it by road to the radioactive facility. Once there, they were unable to pick up the package as the handling agent indicated that they had no notification of receipt of the package at their facilities and therefore did not know its location. Throughout Friday, the consignee searched for information at the cargo at origin (Prague) and destination (Madrid) with the customs broker, freight forwarders, consignor and airline, but the result was unsuccessful. Investigations continued on Monday 16th, December to determine the location of the package. The final conclusions of all the investigation revealed that: - The sender stated that the flight left Prague Airport (PRG), and did not return, so the package must have been unloaded in Madrid. - According to the Travel Service airline, the camera system at Prague airport showed Skyport PRG airport handling staff placing the package on a trolley to the aircraft. They also had a statement from a ramp worker confirming that he loaded the package into the plane. - Skyport PRG searched its warehouse, but did not find the package. - The carrier (Hazmatcargo) requested a search of the station (MAD), where the aircraft later flew, but the results were negative, and the package was not located. On Monday 16th at 11:30 am, the consignee informed the CSN Emergency Room (SALEM) of the occurrence of the event according to IS-18 (instruction of the CSN concerning the radioactive facilities). Subsequently, the CSN Transport Department (ATMR) took charge of the event, once it was established that it was a transport event. Therefore the event should have been reported under IS-42, (Instruction of the CSN concerning event notifications at transport of radioactive material), by the transport enterprise. Once the notification was received, the CSN took the following actions on Monday 16th: - At 13:38 pm, the consignee was contacted by telephone to confirm the data received and to update the status of the event, and to request additional information. - At 14:28 pm,the handling agent was contacted to confirm the shipment data and it indicated that they never received the package at the freight/cargo terminal. - At approximately 17:00 pm, the CSN decided to compose a team of inspectors to visit the handling agent’s facilities at the airport, notifying them of the visit. - At the same time, in the interval until the CSN team arrived at the airport at 19:00 pm, communications with consignee and handling agent were repeated to gather additional information, but new data was not obtained. In the offices of the handling agent at the airport, the CSN team, accompanied by the personnel from the airport's Judicial Police, collected more detailed information from the managers of the handling agent, who contacted with the ground handling agent (the company in charge of ground activities at the airport). The Guardia Civil (Spain’s national law enforcement agency in charge of the customs control and airport security) joined the search for the missing package, checking the security cameras to determine whether the package had been unloaded from the aircraft. During the course of this check, the handling agent’s personnel, after a closer examination of their terminal goods receipt register, identified the entry corresponding to the missing package. Finally, as result of the investigations carried out by the Guardia Civil, the package was located in another terminal of the airport, hidden below a cone. Once the appropriate radiological controls were carried out by the CSN team, and the package was checked to be in perfect conditions, it was transferred to the in-transit radioactive materials storage facility of the handling agent, where it was verified that it was properly stored in compliance with the security measures. Preliminary analysis indicates that there are various regulatory non-compliances in the chain of events leading to the loss of the package. Therefore, an in depth assessment of those non compliances will be made in the short term as part of an inspection of the handling agent by the CSN.
December 18th, 2024 05:15:13 EST -0500 Package containing four radioactive sources lost.
On Thursday 12th December 2024, LOMA SYSTEMS S.R.O. sent from the Czech Republic a B(U) package, model NE4C, with 4 encapsulated radioactive sources of Se-75 (used for industrial radiography) to a radioactive facility located in Madrid. The package was sent from Prague airport, with ticket number AWB 797-1000 2016 of the airline TRAVEL SERVICE, A.S., on flight QS1056, which arrived at 13:05 at Madrid - Barajas Airport. On Friday 13th, staff of the consignee went to the cargo handling facility to pick up the package and transport it by road to the radioactive facility. Once there, they were unable to pick up the package as the handling agent indicated that they had no notification of receipt of the package at their facilities and therefore did not know its location. Throughout Friday, the consignee searched for information at the cargo at origin (Prague) and destination (Madrid) with the customs broker, freight forwarders, consignor and airline, but the result was unsuccessful. Investigations continued on Monday 16th, December to determine the location of the package. The final conclusions of all the investigation revealed that: - The sender stated that the flight left Prague Airport (PRG), and did not return, so the package must have been unloaded in Madrid. - According to the Travel Service airline, the camera system at Prague airport showed Skyport PRG airport handling staff placing the package on a trolley to the aircraft. They also had a statement from a ramp worker confirming that he loaded the package into the plane. - Skyport PRG searched its warehouse, but did not find the package. - The carrier (Hazmatcargo) requested a search of the station (MAD), where the aircraft later flew, but the results were negative, and the package was not located. On Monday 16th at 11:30 am, the consignee informed the CSN Emergency Room (SALEM) of the occurrence of the event according to IS-18 (instruction of the CSN concerning the radioactive facilities). Subsequently, the CSN Transport Department (ATMR) took charge of the event, once it was established that it was a transport event. Therefore the event should have been reported under IS-42, (Instruction of the CSN concerning event notifications at transport of radioactive material), by the transport enterprise. Once the notification was received, the CSN took the following actions on Monday 16th: - At 13:38 pm, the consignee was contacted by telephone to confirm the data received and to update the status of the event, and to request additional information. - At 14:28 pm,the handling agent was contacted to confirm the shipment data and it indicated that they never received the package at the freight/cargo terminal. - At approximately 17:00 pm, the CSN decided to compose a team of inspectors to visit the handling agent’s facilities at the airport, notifying them of the visit. - At the same time, in the interval until the CSN team arrived at the airport at 19:00 pm, communications with consignee and handling agent were repeated to gather additional information, but new data was not obtained. In the offices of the handling agent at the airport, the CSN team, accompanied by the personnel from the airport's Judicial Police, collected more detailed information from the managers of the handling agent, who contacted with the ground handling agent (the company in charge of ground activities at the airport). The Guardia Civil (Spain’s national law enforcement agency in charge of the customs control and airport security) joined the search for the missing package, checking the security cameras to determine whether the package had been unloaded from the aircraft. During the course of this check, the handling agent’s personnel, after a closer examination of their terminal goods receipt register, identified the entry corresponding to the missing package. Finally, as result of the investigations carried out by the Guardia Civil, the package was located in another terminal of the airport, hidden below a cone. Once the appropriate radiological controls were carried out by the CSN team, and the package was checked to be in perfect conditions, it was transferred to the in-transit radioactive materials storage facility of the handling agent, where it was verified that it was properly stored in compliance with the security measures. Preliminary analysis indicates that there are various regulatory non-compliances in the chain of events leading to the loss of the package. Therefore, an in depth assessment of those non compliances will be made in the short term as part of an inspection of the handling agent by the CSN.